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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, THE POLITICAL
PROCESS, AND THE BONDAGE OF
DISCIPLINE
Pamela S. Karlan*
What makes something its own field of study in the legal world?
The appearance of casebooks with the right sort of verbiage in the ti-
tle? The presence of discrete courses in the law school curriculum?
The saturation of the Supreme Court's docket? The recognition of a
coherent set of important social, economic, and political questions to
which the law can contribute?
By any of these measures, regulation of the political process
now qualifies. There are two casebooks-one called The Law of
Democracy: Legal Structure of the Political Process,' the other
called Election Law.2 Many law schools offer survey courses about
the political process, advanced constitutional law courses that essen-
tially cover the First or Fourteenth Amendment aspects of legal
regulation of politics, or seminars that deal with selected topics such
as campaign finance regulation or reapportionment.3 For a variety of
* Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. I thank Eben Moglen, Dan
Ortiz, Rick Pildes, and Kathleen Sullivan for helping me to think through the
ideas in this piece. Over the longer term, Rick and Sam Issacharoff, the other
co-authors of SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN, & RICHARD H.
PILDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL
PROCESS (1998), also deserve credit for helping me to focus on the broader
question of what it means to talk about what the field of study ought to be
about. Even further back, Lani Guinier, Jim Blacksher, Gerry Hebert, Ed Still,
and the other staff lawyers and cooperating attorneys of the NAACP Legal De-
fense and Educational Fund have my deepest gratitude for letting me make, as
well as write and teach about, the law of the political process.
1. SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN, & RICHARD H. PILDES,
THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS
(1998).
2. DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
(1995).
3. An unsystematic list of schools at which courses have been taught in
the last few years includes: Albany, American University, Chicago-Kent, Co-
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reasons,4 an increasing share of the Supreme Court's dwindling
docket seems to involve cases about politics.
5
But the arrival of casebooks, courses, and law review symposia
about the political process is not like the recent arrival of casebooks
and courses about cyberspace or telecommunications or ERISA. It
cannot be explained primarily as a function of the advent of new
technology or the passage of a new statute. Problems regarding
democratic rights and political structure preoccupied both the Fram-
ers and the authors of Reconstruction; a majority of the constitutional
amendments passed since the Bill of Rights involve the political
system; many of the principal cases in The Law of Democracy are
decades old; and pervasive federal legislation dates back at least to
the Voting Rights Act of 19656 and the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1974.7
lumbia, Cornell, Fordham, Georgetown, Harvard, Indiana, Loyola of Los An-
geles, New York University, Nova Southeastern, Pace, Rutgers, Stanford, Tu-
lane, the University of California at Los Angeles, the University of Chicago,
the University of Georgia, the University of Miami, the University of Michi-
gan, the University of Mississippi, the University of Texas, the University of
Virginia, Washington and Lee, and Yale.
4. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Supreme Court and Voting Rights: Deja Vu
All Over Again?, VOTING RTS. REv., Summer 1997, at I (pointing to the pres-
ence of mandatory appellate review of legislative reapportionments plus the
explosion of litigation involving claims of racial gerrymandering in the wake
of Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), as two reasons for this phenomenon).
5. In the current Supreme Court term alone, see, for example, Hunt v.
Cromartie, 119 S. Ct. 1545 (1999) (reviewing, for the third time, the role of ra-
cial considerations in North Carolina's congressional reapportionment); Rice v.
Cayetano, 119 S. Ct. 1248 (1999) (granting certiorari to consider Hawaii's re-
striction of the right to vote in elections for the Office of Hawaiian Affairs);
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 119 S. Ct. 901 (1999) (granting certio-
rari to consider campaign spending limits); Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd.,
119 S. Ct. 899 (1999) (noting probable jurisdiction to consider the scope of
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act); Department of Commerce v. United States
House of Representatives, 119 S. Ct. 765 (1999) (barring the use of statistical
sampling to apportion House seats among the states); Lopez v. Monterey
County, 119 S. Ct. 693 (1999) (requiring county to seek preclearance of
changes in how it elects judges); Buckley v. American Constitutional Law
Found., 119 S. Ct. 636 (1999) (striking down state limitations on signature
gatherers for initiative petitions).
6. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973bb (1994)).
7. Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§
431-56 (1994)).
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Like Moliere's M. Jourdain, who had been speaking prose all
his life without knowing it,8 scholars have routinely been teaching
and writing about questions of political participation and electoral
structure without treating them as a field of their own. To the extent
that legal regulation of the political process is becoming a field in its
own right, it is traveling down a path that other subjects have trod be-
fore. It is leaving constitutional law's empire. Consider the follow-
ing two statements from different iterations of the leading constitu-
tional law casebook, written originally by Noel T. Dowling, then by
Gerald Gunther, and now by Gunther and Kathleen M. Sullivan:
9
A restricted treatment of taxation is partly justified by the
fact that an increasing number of schools offer a separate
course on this subject. By the same token that it is steadily
gaining a place of its own (thus evidencing its increasing
scope, intricacy, and importance), it is outgrowing a place
in the course on Constitutional Law.'
Over the years, some areas once staples of constitutional
law courses have developed such an identity and complex-
ity of their own as to warrant treatment as separate disci-
plines. What was once the fate of administrative law, for
example, has now become appropriate for the constitutional
requirements of criminal procedure."
Seeing how the Dowling-Gunther-Sullivan casebooks have
treated questions about political participation and structure sheds
light both on the need for thinking about the law of politics 12 as a
field in itself and on the relationship between writing and teaching
8. Jean Moli~re, Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme, act 2, scene 4, line 34
(1670).
9. For ease of exposition, I refer to the editions of the book discussed in
the text by the number of the edition.
10. NOEL T. DOWLING, CASES ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW vii
(Ist ed. 1937).
11. GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
xx (9th ed. 1975). For a brief description of the arrival and expatriation of
criminal procedure in the Dowling-Gunther casebooks, see Pamela S. Karlan,
Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2001,
2001-02 (1998).
12. For reasons explained in Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes's con-
tribution to this symposium, I think the term "election law" sends the wrong
message about the scope of the field. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H.
Pildes, Not By "Election Law"Alone, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1173 (1999).
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about the political process and the larger project of constitutional
law. My sense is that the emergence of courses like the ones the
contributors to this symposium teach is a good thing. But in addition
to teaching students how to think about problems related to the po-
litical process they may encounter as law clerks, litigators, or poli-
cymakers, the major virtue of treating the law of the political process
as a coherent subject lies in enabling scholars and students to see
connections among the various pieces of constitutional law and stat-
utes that influence how our politics is conducted. It would be un-
fortunate for everyone concerned if legal regulation of the political
process were to hive off completely from constitutional law and the
two bodies were to evolve separately to thepoint where there is little
possibility of continued cross-fertilization.1T Just as other aspects of
constitutional law cannot be fully understood divorced from the po-
litical institutions that produce them, so too our political institutions
and practices cannot be understood in a vacuum: they are a piece of
constitutional law.
It's not as if the First Edition of the Dowling casebook had to
banish taxation to its own course in order to make room for questions
about political rights and institutions. Although the preface identi-
fied "the regulatory power of government" as the prima materia of
constitutional law, there was virtually nothing in the book about
regulating the political process. For example, the First Edition
omitted any discussion of the Supreme Court's evisceration of con-
gressional attempts to enforce the right to vote in United States v.
Cruikshank'5 and United States v. Reese. 16 The only voting-related
principal cases were Nixon v. Condon17 and Grovey v. Townsend1-8_
two white primary cases used to illustrate the problem of state action.
In the chapter on the Equal Protection Clause, none of the existing
voting rights cases were discussed in text. Cases like Minor v.
13. For a discussion of the extent to which cross-fertilization has occurred
between constitutional law and criminal procedure, see Carol S. Steiker, "First
Principles" of Constitutional Criminal Procedure: A Mistake?, 112 HARV. L.
REv. 680, 684-85 (1999).
14. DOWLING, supra note 10, at vii.
15. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
16. 92 U.S. 214 (1876). For a discussion of Supreme Court decisions re-
garding the right to vote from Reconstruction through 1937, see Armand
Derfiier, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV. 523,
525-42 (1973).
17. 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
18. 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
1188
THE BONDAGE OF DISCIPLINE
Happersett,19 Giles v. Harris,2 ° and Guinn v. United States,21 which
each play a substantial role in The Law of Democracy,22 were con-
tained in a single long note.23
The most interesting feature of the next few editions of Dowl-
ing's book was where the scanty discussions of voting rights ap-
peared. The book, like Gaul, came to be divided into three parts-
the judicial function, the federal system, and individual rights; it
retains them to this day.24 The White Primary Cases, and-more
significantly-the notes on Giles, were placed in the individual rights
section. For reasons that I have explored elsewhere, the implicit deci-
sion to treat questions of political participation as ones of individual
rights-rather than, say, questions of institutional structure-has im-
portant consequences for the waty both courts and scholars think
about the meaning of democracy.
25
So, basically, the book remained, up through the final edition
written by Dowling alone, the Sixth.2 3 Gerald Gunther's arrival on
the Seventh Edition, which was published in 1965, coincided with
the Reapportionment Revolution and the Voting Rights Act. The
19. 88 U.S. 162 (1875).
20. 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
21. 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
22. See ISSACHAROFF, KARLAN & PILDES, supra note 1, at 22-33, 69-77
(excerpting and discussing Minor, Giles, and Guinn).
23. See DOWLING, supra note 10, at 1045-46 n.3. For an example of con-
temporaneous scholarship on an important issue that might have been incorpo-
rated into the First Edition, see Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Congressional Reappor-
tionment, 42 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (1929).
24. See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW ix-xi (13th ed. 1997) (summary of contents, dividing the book into three
parts---"The Judicial Function in Constitutional Cases," "The Structure of
Government: Nation and States in the Federal Systems," and "Individual
Rights").
25. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Not By Politics Alone, 85 VA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1999); Lani Guinier & Pamela S. Karlan, The Majoritarian Diffi-
culty: One Person, One-Vote, in REASON AND PASSION: JUSTICE BRENNAN'S
ENDURING INFLUENCE 207, 210 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz & Bernard Schwartz
eds., 1997).
26. See NOEL T. DOWLING, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1077 (6th ed.
1959) (discussing United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), and Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), in Chapter 13--"national protection of civil
rights"). Interestingly, the book makes relatively little of the fact that Classic
involved a federally initiated prosecution of ballot fraud in a case without any
racial salience while Smith involved a private lawsuit by a black plaintiff chal-
lenging his exclusion from the all-white Texas Democratic Party primary.
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Seventh Edition had far more extensive material about political and
electoral structures. And this time, it was dispersed throughout the
book. In the part related to thejudicial function, a substantial section
was devoted to Baker v. Carr2' and the cases preceding it, including
Colegrove v. Green28 and Gomillion v. Lighyfoot.29 Of even more
interest, the second part of the Seventh Edition, which dealt with "the
federal system," devoted a substantial portion of the chapter on con-
gressional power to "protection of the franchise."30 This section,
perhaps more than any other piece of the book, illustrated the change
from Cases on Constitutional Law-the title of the Sixth Edition-to
Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law-the title of the Seventh.
The section contained a substantial amount of the legislative history
surrounding the Voting Rights Act of 1965,31 as well as the entire,
detailed text of the 1965 Act. It also raised a variety of issues sur-
rounding the newly ratified Twenty-Fourth Amendment, 32 and it pre-
sented a range of Supreme Court opinions on issues such as the liter-
acy test and the white primary. Finally, cases involving political
structure played a larger role in the book's treatment of individual
rights. The book ended with a chapter on "some problems in equal
protection," whose final section was devoted to legislative appor-
tionment. This was where the Seventh Edition placed the recently
decided Reynolds v. Sims,33 which announced the requirement of
"one-person, one-vote."
What to make of the Seventh Edition? Like the Supreme Court,
the world of constitutional law was becoming aware that regulation
of the political process raised profound questions concerning the
permissible extent of judicial review; the relative claims of majori-
ties, minorities, and discrete groups; and the relationship among the
courts, Congress, and the states. The interesting thing is how unde-
veloped the curriculum was, and remains, with respect to the con-
nections among these questions. Although the Supreme Court and
27. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
28. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
29. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). See NOEL T. DOWLING & GERALD GUNTHER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 170-84 (7th ed. 1965).
30. DOWLING & GUNTHER, supra note 29, at 472-501. When discussing
titles of chapters in the text, I have omitted the original capitalization and
punctuation for the sake of readability.
31. See id. at 473-84.
32. See id. at 488.
33. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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Congress recognized that disenfranchisement and dilution were re-
lated to one another, the Seventh Edition separated the issues in order
to fit them into an overarching framework unrelated to their opera-
tion within the political system.
The first Gunther-only version of Cases and Materials on Con-
stitutional Law34 -the Ninth Edition--essentially overhauled the
book, and with it, the treatment of political issues. The "political
question" and "justiciability" materials were moved to the very end
of the book, to a new chapter on the "proper conditions for constitu-
tional adjudication." 35 One section of that chapter looked at "non-
justiciable 'political questions,' 'judicially discoverable and manage-
able standards,' and 'reapportionment litigation;"' 36 it covered the
cases from Baker v. Carr through Reynolds v. Sims-which both in-
volved claims of malapportionment, or quantitative vote dilution-as
well as cases like Gaffnhey v. Cummings,37 Whitcomb v. Chavis,38 and
White v. Regester3 9 -which involved the knottier claims of qualita-
tive vote dilution through either gerrymandering or the use of multi-
member electoral districts that submerged racially identifiable nu-
merical minorities. It ended with Gordon v. Lance,40 an undeserv-
edly obscure case about the supermajority voting requirements in
bond elections that raises a host of interesting practical and theoreti-
cal questions.4a
Although the Ninth Edition substantially expanded the materials
devoted to reapportionment-mirroring the explosion of litigation on
the topic-this advance was balanced by the disappearance of the
extensive materials about the 1965 Act. The legislative history and
extensive coverage of the statute itself was replaced with cases con-
cerning the scope of Congress's enforcement power under section
five of the Fourteenth Amendment.42 And the treatment of the right
to participate was packed into a chapter on "'the fundamental rights
and interests' strand of the 'new' equal protection," that also
34. GUNTHER, supra note 11.
35. Id. at 1532-1653.
36. Id. at 1617-53.
37. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
38. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
39. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
40. 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
41. See ISSACHAROFF, KARLAN & PILDES, supra note 1, at 155-57 (dis-
cussing Gordon); Guinier & Karlan, supra note 25, at 211-13 (same).
42. See GUNTHER, supra note 11, at 998.
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contained cases about access to the judicial process, the right to
travel, and residency restrictions. 43 Again, cases about politics were
allocated among the parts of the book in order to illustrate more gen-
eral ideas about constitutional law, rather than attempting to provide
a coherent understanding of constitutional and statutory regulation of
the political process. That pattern held through the last Gunther-only
edition-the Twelfth-in 1991. 44 The one major change was the ap-
pearance of a substantial section on campaign finance in a new
chapter entitled "freedom of expression in some special contexts.
45
The current edition of the book4 6 -the Thirteenth-offers a
thorough discussion of the case law about politics. Although the
book continues the tripartite structure of earlier editions, roughly
seventy-five percent of the materials now fall in the final part, which
remains entitled "individual rights. 4 7  With two notable excep-
tions-Baker v. Carr, which is a primary case in Part I's coverage of
issues of justiciability and political questions, 4' and U.S. Term Lim-
its, Inc. v. Thornton,49 which concludes the chapter in Part II on
questions of federalism-related limits on national power by identify-
ing an "antifederalist revival"' 5 0-that is where the Thirteenth Edition
assigns cases about the political process.
It is interesting to compare the Thirteenth Edition's treatment of
Baker and Thornton with how we treat the same two cases in The
Law of Democracy. The Thirteenth Edition devotes roughly thirty-
five pages to the two cases, compared to thirty pages in The Law of
Democracy. But The Law of Democracy has far more extensive
notes and questions. The real differences show up here.51 The Thir-
teenth Edition connects Baker with a series of "political question"
cases-Powell v. McCormack,52 Goldwater v. Carter,53 and Nixon v.
43. Id. at 788-809.
44. GERALD GuNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (12th ed. 1991).
45. Id. at 1357.
46. GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 24.
47. Id. at415-1553.
48. See id. at 47-53.
49. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
50. GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 24, at 115-40.
51. The Thirteenth Edition's excerpt from Baker is seven pages long, while
The Law of Democracy's excerpt is 11 pages, but the ratios are reversed for
Thornton, to which the Thirteenth Edition devotes 25 pages while The Law of
Democracy spends only 10.
52. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
53. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
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United States 4 -that have very little to do with politics.55 Similarly,
with respect to Thornton, the Thirteenth Edition locates the case
within a progression-beginning with McCulloch v. Maryland56 and
culminating in New York v. United States,
57 United States v. Lopez,58
and Seminole Tribe v. Florida59 -that is concerned primarily with
congressional power vis-a'-vis the states.
60
By contrast, while Baker and Thornton are separated by 500
more pages in The Law of Democracy than they are in the Thirteenth
Edition,°' one unifying concern is made quite clear. From the outset,
The Law of Democracy identifies the question of entrenchment as a
central theme in the study of legal regulation of the political process:
Because democratic politics is not autonomous of existing
law and institutions, those who control existing arrange-
ments have the capacity to shape, manipulate, and distort
democratic processes. Historical experience provides con-
vincing reasons to believe that those who currently hold
power will deploy that power to try to preserve their con-
trol. Thus, democratic politics constantly confronts the
prospect of law being used to freeze existing political ar-
rangements into place .... Yet there is no way to take the
law "out" of democracy. The question, then, is what the
law might contribute to mediating or resolving this tension.
Can institutional arrangements be developed that both
54. 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
55. Cf Steve Martin, Studies in the New Causality, THE NEW YORKER, Oct.
26 & Nov. 2, 1998, at 108 (facetiously identifying "semantic causality" as the
"causality [that] occurs when a word or phrase in the cause is the same as a
word or phrase in the effect" and giving the example "'You failed to install my
client's sink properly, causing her to sink into a depression."'). "Semantic cau-
sality" turns out to be a useful concept in describing the Supreme Court's
treatment of the "political question" doctrine in the political arena. Consider
Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903), for example, in which Justice Holmes
refused to reach the merits of the disenfranchised voters' claims because "relief
from a great political wrong... must be given... by the legislative and politi-
cal department of the government of the United States." Id. at 488.
56. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
57. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
58. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
59. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
60. See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 24, at 113-14.
61. Roughly seventy pages separate the two cases in the Thirteenth Edition,
while roughly 570 pages separate them in The Law of Democracy.
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reflect the inevitable role of law in shaping democracy and
at the same time prevent that role from being manipulated
by existing office holders for self-interested aims? That is
the other side of the mutual relationship between law and
democracy we stress: the need to find techniques and theo-
ries that prevent the capture of democratic politics by ex-
isting distributions of political power.
62
The notes and questions following Baker point to the potential
process failure identified in Justice Clark's concurrence: there was
no way to force the political faction currently in control over the
legislature to revisit the allocation of political power. 63 Similarly, in
the notes and questions following Thornton, The Law of Democracy
suggests that term-limit initiatives reflect the same anti-entrenchment
sentiment-this time expressed by the electorate as a whole-that
motivated judicial intervention in the reapportionment cases, 6A The
connections The Law of Democracy draws to other lines of cases in-
volve, not surprisingly, other aspects of the political process, ranging
from campaign finance to political gerrymandering to regulation of
political parties.
65
It's not that those other cases are absent from the Thirteenth
Edition. Far from it. All the topics we cover in The Law of Democ-
racy are in the Thirteenth Edition, along with at least a summary of
virtually all of what we specialists have come to identify as the prin-
cipal cases. I don't know of any other book that summarizes the
various doctrines more encyclopedically. Still, the Thirteenth Edition
gives relatively little attention to the connections among these differ-
ent doctrinal lines. Rather, it uses voting rights and reapportionment
problems as illustrations of more general equal protection issues of
suspect classification or fundamental rights. Similarly, the campaign
finance cases are treated as involving "rights ancillary to freedom of
speech."66 More generally, precisely because the cases about politics
are classified as individual rights cases, the casual reader risks over-
looking a central point:
62. ISSACHAROFF, KARLAN & PILDES, supra note 1, at 2.
63. See id. at 134-35.
64. See id. at 705-06 (excerpting an argument from Michael J. Klarman,
Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491,
510 (1997)).
65. See ISSACHAROFF, KARLAN & PILDES, supra note 1, at 707-09, 711-12.
66. GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 24, at 1361 (title of Chapter 13).
1194
THE BONDAGE OF DISCIPLINE
The kind of democratic politics we have is always and in-
evitably itself a product of institutional forms and legal
structures .... These institutional structures all limit and
define the decisions available through democratic politics
itself. In turn, these institutional arrangements are either
the inherited product of prior democratic choice or of iner-
tia-or perhaps some combination of the two.
67
The Law of Democracy has the luxury of treating the law of
politics far more deeply than the Thirteenth Edition can. Even
though roughly ten percent of the Thirteenth Edition is devoted to le-
gal regulation of the political process, that still amounts to only about
160 pages, less than one-fifth the space used by The Law of Democ-
racy. The additional room allows us to include more extensive ex-
cerpts from the cases to give readers a better sense of the Court's and
the concurring and dissenting justices' reasoning as well as the doc-
trinal bottom line and to provide historical, social scientific, and
comparative perspectives of a kind that is relatively rare in a synoptic
book on American constitutional law. The Law of Democracy, for
example, contains extensive materials on alternatives to the tradi-
tional American system of geographically-based electoral districts;
68
a version of the Alabama literacy test that graphically illustrates how
low-level discretion was used to disenfranchise blacks; 69 lower court
decisions to give students a real sense of how Supreme Court deci-
sions get interpreted and applied; 70 and a case study of the Voting
Rights Act's administrative preclearance process 71 that relies on in-
temal Justice Department documents and congressional testimony as
well as reported judicial decisions.
Put somewhat differently, the Thirteenth Edition uses the core
voting rights cases centrifugally--the case analyses spin outward
into connections with other aspects of constitutional law-while The
Law of Democracy uses them centripetally-to show the "complex
interaction between democratic politics and the formal institutions of
67. See ISSACHAROFF, KARLAN & PILDES, supra note 1, at 1-2.
68. See id. at 713-85 (chapter on alternative election systems, containing a
detailed case study of how such a system operated in Chilton County, Ala-
bama).
69. See id. at 98-102.
70. See id. at 464-99 (illustrating the interpretation of the test laid out in
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), for proving racial vote dilution un-
der section 2 of the Voting Rights Act).
71. See id. at 336-66.
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the state." 72 Both forms of connection are valuable, but they are dif-
ferent.
Still, it is almost impossible to imagine a synoptic account of
constitutional law as it is practiced today-:and the Thirteenth Edi-
tion is the preeminent example of the genre7 3-that would omit dis-
cussion of political participation, reapportionment, campaign fi-
nance, or direct democracy the way virtually all constitutional law
casebooks now omit real treatment of constitutional criminal proce-
dure. Perhaps it is just my personal bias, but a constitutional law
course that covered the fundamental rights strand of strict scrutiny
without looking at the right to vote, or state action without at least a
nod at the White Primary Cases, or affirmative action without ac-
counting for the Shaw cases, or the political question doctrine with-
out mentioning Baker v. Carr would seem just loony. Nor do I think
that one can do justice to the doctrine of judicial review without at
least confronting the questions of process failure and entrenchment
that come to the foreground in cases involving political institutions
and arrangements. So I see no likelihood that the law of politics will
disappear from the conventional constitutional law course in the near
future.
What then does it mean to talk about the legal structure of the
political process as its own field of study? The law governing poli-
tics is a form of applied constitutional law; it involves repeated inter-
actions among statutes and constitutional provisions, courts and leg-
islatures, and state and national governments. Moreover, looking at
the statutes, structures, and cases that govern our politics as it is ac-
tually conducted may offer a far richer avenue for understanding
constitutional law generally than pursuing ever more theoretical and
abstract forms of constitutional theory has done.
Reaching for the world, as our lives do,
As all lives do, reaching that we may give
The best of what we are and hold as true:
Always it is by bridges that we live.
74
The great thing about the law of the political process, at least as
it has developed so far, is the opportunities it offers for building
72. Id. at 1.
73. Its only real rival is LAURENCE H. TRIE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (2d ed. 1988), but Tribe's treatise is now seriously out of date and await-
ing a new edition.
74. PHILIP LARKIN, Bridge for the Living, in COLLECTED POEMS 203-04
(1989).
THE BONDAGE OF DISCIPLINE
bridges. Some of those bridges are interdisciplinary: they connect
law and legal doctrine to perspectives that political scientists, histori-
ans, and sociologists have developed. 75 Some of the bridges are in-
tradisciplinary, as scholars who began by focusing on relatively nar-
row issues within, for example, racial vote dilution under the Voting
Rights Act, apply insights from their work to other problems in con-
stitutional law or theory, or as scholars in other areas borrow from
the themes developed in the case law surrounding politics or the
scholarship we produce.76 And some of them are quite practical, as
professors who study reapportionment or campaign finance find
themselves actively involved in litigation that both applies and in-
forms their teaching and scholarship. Perhaps in no other area of
constitutional law is there as close a connection between scholarship
and practical problems or between scholars and litigators. It would
be misfortune indeed if the profusion of scholarship about the legal
regulation of the political process led constitutional law scholars to
think either that we don't need them, or that they don't need us.
Banish plump Jack, and banish all the world.
75. For some recent and instructive examples of interdisciplinary works on
minority voting and representation, see KEITH J. BYBEE, MISTAKEN IDENTITY:
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE POLITICS OF MINORITY REPRESENTATION
(1998); J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING
AND THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION (1999); DAVID LUBLIN,
THE PARADOX OF REPRESENTATION: RACIAL GERRYMANDERING AND
MINORITY INTERESTS IN CONGRESS (1997).
76. See, e.g., Richard Thompson Ford, Geography and Sovereignty: Juris-
dictional Formation and Racial Segregation, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1365 (1997);
John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Daryl J. Levinson, The Non-Retrogression Principle in
Constitutional Law, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1211 (1998).
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